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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Roger Lee Day appeals the enhancement of his sentence 
for bank robbery under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines ("U.S.S.G."). Pursuant to a plea agreement, Day 
pled guilty before the District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania to two counts of bank robbery. At 
sentencing, the District Court adopted the recommendation 
in the presentence investigation report that Day's sentence 
be enhanced two levels because he made a "threat of death" 
while committing the robberies. U.S.S.G. S 2B3.1(b)(2)(F).1 
This threat consisted of Day's passing notes to tellers at the 
banks he robbed that read, "Put some money on the 
counter. No dye packs. I have a gun." The District Court 
heard arguments on the appropriateness of this 
enhancement and concluded that the enhancement was 
warranted under this Court's holding in United States v. 
Figueroa, 105 F.3d 874 (3d Cir. 1997). In Figueroa, the 
defendant used a note that read in relevant part,"I have a 
gun. Give me all the money." Id. at 876. 
 
In this appeal, Day argues that Figueroa does not apply 
to this case because the Sentencing Guidelines in effect at 
that time required an "express threat of death" while the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. U.S.S.G. S 2B3.1(b) addresses specific offense characteristics for 
robbery. Subsection 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) states in full:"[I]f a threat of death 
was made, increase by 2 levels." 
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Guideline has since been amended to require only a"threat 
of death." He contends that the removal of the word 
"express" somehow narrowed the scope of this provision 
and that the Commentary supports this interpretation. We 
disagree and thus affirm Day's sentence. 
 
I. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. S 3742(a). Section 3742(a) provides 
that a "defendant may file a notice of appeal in the district 
court for review of an otherwise final sentence if the 
sentence . . . (2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect 
application of the sentencing guidelines . . . ." Our review 
of the District Court's application and interpretation of the 
Sentencing Guidelines is plenary. United States v. Hallman, 




Day concedes that, if not for a 1997 amendment to the 
Sentencing Guidelines, his case appears "strikingly similar" 
to Figueroa.2 The amendment to which he refers took effect 
on November 1, 1997. It deleted the word "express" from 
the phrase "express threat of death," modified the 
accompanying Commentary to acknowledge that either an 
explicit or implicit threat would suffice, and slightly altered 
the Commentary language to explain the provision's intent 
to raise the offense level in cases in which the offender 
instills in a reasonable victim a fear of death. 3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Prior to the amendment, U.S.S.G. S 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) read: "[I]f an 
express 
threat of death was made, increase by 2 levels." 
 
3. The Commentary, as amended, provides as follows: 
 
       "A threat of death," as used in subsection (b)(2)(F), may be in the 
       form of an oral or written statement, act, gesture, or combination 
       thereof. Accordingly, the defendant does not have to state 
expressly 
       his intent to kill the victim in order for the enhancement to 
apply. 
       For example, an oral or written demand using words such as "Give 
       me the money or I will kill you", "Give me the money or I will pull 
       the pin on the grenade I have in my pocket","Give me the money or 
       I will shoot you", "Give me your money or else (where the defendant 
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The only question we must answer is whether this 
amendment to U.S.S.G. S 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) subsequent to 
Figueroa could have invalidated that case. We conclude, to 
the contrary, that by removing the word "express" from the 
enhancement criteria, the Sentencing Commission did no 
more than clarify its approval of the result reached in 
Figueroa and similar cases decided by our sister courts of 
appeals. 
 
Even when S 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) required an "express" threat of 
death, we held in Figueroa that the exact words "I have a 
gun" would suffice to trigger a two-point sentence 
enhancement. Day argues, however, that under the 
amended Guideline, in which the word "express" has been 
removed, the same words somehow no longer qualify as a 
threat of death. This argument does not make sense. The 
deletion of the word "express" plainly broadened the 
Guideline rather than narrowed it. Even if, contrary to 
Figueroa, the words "I have a gun" did not constitute an 
express threat of death, under the current Guideline 
language they would still qualify for the enhancement 
because they are an implicit threat of death. We thus agree 
with the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. 
Gibson, 155 F.3d 844 (7th Cir. 1998), which held that the 
words "I have a gun" can constitute a threat of death under 
the amended Guideline provision. Id. at 847. 
 
Notably, we already anticipated this case in the Figueroa 
opinion. At that time, we reached the obvious conclusion 
that our result would be the same -- in fact, it would be 
even more clearly correct -- under the amended Guideline. 
We wrote that 
 
       [w]hile we do not doubt that our result is correct under 
       section 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) and the commentary as it is now 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       draws his hand across his throat in a slashing motion)", or "Give 
me 
       the money or you are dead" would constitute a threat of death. The 
       court should consider that the intent of this provision is to 
provide 
       an increased offense level for cases in which the offender(s) 
engaged 
       in conduct that would instill in a reasonable person, who is a 
victim 
       of the offense, a fear of death. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 2B3.1(b)(2)(F), cmt. n.6 (2001). 
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       written, we take note of the circumstance that the 
       United States Sentencing Commission has proposed an 
       amendment to the commentary to make clear that the 
       Commission's intent has been in accord with the 
       majority position we now are joining. 
 
Figueroa, 105 F.3d at 880. Likewise, the dissent in Figueroa 
argued that the word "express" in the Guideline indicated 
that it could not apply to an implicit threat such as "I have 
a gun," but that after the proposed amendment took effect, 
that difficulty would disappear. Id. at 881-82. That 
amendment passed exactly as we anticipated, and we see 
no reason now to reach a different result than the one we 
predicted. 
 
The primary argument that Day offers for his 
interpretation is that the explanatory comment 
accompanying the amendment demonstrated the 
Sentencing Commission's intent to depart from Figueroa. 
He points out in particular that the explanatory comment 
does not explicitly approve Figueroa but does refer to other 
cases, namely United States v. Robinson, 86 F.3d 1197 
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding an express threat of death where 
appellant had only used a note stating, "Give me a pack of 
20s or I will shoot somebody in here now."), and United 
States v. Murray, 65 F.3d 1161 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding an 
express threat of death where the defendant stated,"Give 
me three stacks of $20s. Don't give me a dye pack. I have 
a gun pointed at you . . . . You think I'm playing?"). In 
addition, he notes that the explanatory comment refers to 
the "combination of the defendant's actions and words" as 
the basis for an enhancement. Our examination of the 




4. The text of the explanatory comment reads: 
 
       This amendment addresses a circuit court conflict regarding the 
       application of the "express threat of death" enhancement in S 2B3.1 
       (Robbery). The amendment adopts the majority appellate view which 
       holds that the enhancement applies when the combination of the 
       defendant's actions and words would instill in a reasonable person 
       in the position of the immediate victim (e.g., a bank teller) a 
greater 
       amount of fear than necessary to commit the robbery. See, e.g., 
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In the first place, even if the Commission's explanatory 
comment had made it into the Commentary itself (which it 
did not), we would not be required to follow it to the extent 
it conflicts with or misinterprets the Guideline. Stinson v. 
United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993). In this case, a 
reading of the amendment that barred implicit threats of 
death (which "I have gun" surely is to the extent that it is 
not explicit) would flatly contradict the language of 
S 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) itself. 
 
Second, and more importantly, nothing in the 
explanatory comment suggests a rejection of Figueroa. On 
the contrary, the comment states that the amendment 
adopts the "majority appellate view," which is also the view 
we adopted in Figueroa. See Figueroa, 105 F.3d at 878-79 
("[I]n light of the commentary's direction to consider the 
effect of the threat upon the reasonable victim, we find the 
reasoning of the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Seventh, 
Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits 
more persuasive."). The majority appellate position provides 
that whether a threat of death is express depends in part 
on the perception of the reasonable recipient of the threat 
rather than solely on whether the perpetrator made an 
explicit threat to kill the victim. Id. at 877. We agree that 
the explanatory comment did not mention Figueroa , but 
that hardly means that it rejected it. Likewise, the 
references to Robinson and Murray as examples of adequate 
threats of death do not undermine the validity of Figueroa. 
The threat in Figueroa may have been less explicit, but 
nowhere does the Commentary provide that Robinson and 
Murray represent the only examples of language that would 
qualify for the enhancement. On the contrary, we cited 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       United States v. Robinson, 86 F.3d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
       (enhancement applies if (1) a reasonable person in the position of 
       the immediate victim would very likely believe the defendant made 
       a threat and the threat was to kill, and (2) the victim likely 
thought 
       his life was in peril); United States v. Murray , 65 F.3d 1161, 
1167 
       (4th Cir. 1995) ("any combination of statements, gestures, or 
actions 
       that would put an ordinary victim in reasonable fear for his or her 
       life is an express threat of death"). 
 
U.S.S.G. app. C, Amendment 552 (1997). 
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approvingly to both Robinson and Murray  in the Figueroa 
opinion. Figueroa, 105 F.3d at 877. 
 
Third, and finally, Day incorrectly emphasizes the 
language referring to "words and actions" in the 
 
explanatory comment. The Commission's examples plainly 
demonstrate that the robber need not use both words and 
actions to communicate a threat of death. See, e.g., 
Robinson, 86 F.3d at 1198 (finding an express threat of 
death where appellant used only a note); Murray , 65 F.3d 
at 1166 (finding an express threat of death where the 
defendant only orally threatened to use his gun). Moreover, 
the Commentary itself sanctions words alone as enough by 
providing that " `[a] threat of death,' as used in subsection 
(b)(2)(F), may be in the form of an oral or written statement, 
act, gesture, or combination thereof." U.S.S.G. 
S 2B3.1(b)(2)(F), cmt. n.6. There is thus no merit to Day's 





The 1997 amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines on 
which Day relies did not alter our holding in Figueroa. If 
anything, the amendment only reaffirmed the outcome in 
that case. In this context, Figueroa applies almost exactly to 
the facts before us, and thus the judgment of the District 
Court is affirmed. 
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